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In October 2022, when Rishi Sunak assumed office as the UK's leader, he was the fifth consecutive UK leader to take up the role in six years.

Triggered in the UK by Britain's EU exit, this signified exceptional governmental instability. So how might we describe what is occurring in the French Republic, now on its sixth premier in two years – three of them in the last ten months?

The current premier, the newly reinstated Sébastien Lecornu, may have secured a temporary reprieve on that day, abandoning Emmanuel Macron’s flagship pensions overhaul in return for opposition Socialist votes as the price for his administration's continuation.

But it is, at best, a short-term solution. The EU’s second-largest economy is trapped in a political permacrisis, the scale of which it has not experienced for decades – possibly not since the start of its Fifth Republic in 1958 – and from which there seems no easy escape.

Minority Rule

Essential context: from the moment Macron initiated an risky early parliamentary vote in 2024, France has had a hung parliament separated into three warring blocs – the left, the far right and his own centrist coalition – without any group holding a clear majority.

At the same time, the country faces dual debt and deficit crises: its debt-to-GDP ratio and deficit are now nearly double the EU limit, and hard constitutional deadlines to pass a 2026 budget that starts controlling expenditures are nigh.

Against that unforgiving backdrop, both the prime ministers before Lecornu – Michel Barnier, who lasted from September to December 2024, and François Bayrou, who took office from December 2024 to September 2025 – were removed by parliament.

In September, the president appointed his trusted associate Lecornu as his latest PM. But when, just over a fortnight later, Lecornu presented his government team – which turned out to be largely unchanged from before – he faced fury from both supporters and rivals.

So much so that the next day, he resigned. After just 27 days in office, Lecornu became the shortest-lived premier in recent French history. In a respectful address, he cited political rigidity, saying “partisan attitudes” and “certain egos” would make his job virtually unworkable.

Another twist in the tale: shortly after Lecornu’s resignation, Macron asked him to stay on for two more days in a final attempt to salvage cross-party backing – a mission, to put it mildly, filled with challenges.

Next, two of Macron’s former PMs publicly turned on the embattled president. Meanwhile, the far-right National Rally (RN) and radical left France Unbowed (LFI) declined to engage with Lecornu, vowing to reject all future administrations unless there were snap elections.

Lecornu stuck at his job, talking to everyone who was prepared to hear him out. At the conclusion of his extension, he went on TV to say he thought “a solution remained possible” to prevent a vote. The leader's team confirmed the president would appoint a new prime minister 48 hours later.

Macron kept his promise – and on Friday reappointed Sébastien Lecornu. So this week – with Macron helpfully sniping from the sidelines that the nation's opposing groups were “fuelling division” and “solely responsible for this chaos” – was Lecornu’s moment of truth. Could he survive – and is he able to approve the crucial budget?

In a critical address, the young prime minister outlined his financial plans, giving the centre-left Socialist party (PS), who detest Macron’s unpopular pension overhaul, what they were expecting: Macron’s key policy would be suspended until 2027.

With the right-wing LR already on board, the Socialists said they would not back censorship votes tabled against Lecornu by the extremist factions – meaning the government should survive those ballots, scheduled for Thursday.

It is, however, far from guaranteed to be able to pass its planned €30bn budget squeeze: the PS explicitly warned that it would be seeking more concessions. “This move,” said its leader, Olivier Faure, “is only the beginning.”

A Cultural Shift

The issue is, the greater concessions he makes to the left, the more he will meet resistance from the centre-right. And, similar to the Socialists, the conservatives are themselves divided over how to handle the new government – certain members remain eager to bring it down.

A look at the seat numbers shows how difficult his mission – and longer-term survival – will be. A total of 264 deputies from the far-right RN, radical-left LFI, Greens, Communists and UDR want him out.

To achieve that, they need a 288-vote majority in parliament – so if they can convince only 24 of the PS’s 69 members or the LR’s 47 (or both) to vote with them, Macron’s fifth unstable premier in two years is, similar to his forerunners, finished.

Few would bet against that happening sooner rather than later. Although, by an unlikely turn, the dysfunctional assembly musters collective will to approve a budget this year, the outlook afterward look grim.

So does an exit exist? Early elections would be doubtful to resolve the issue: polls suggest pretty much every party bar the RN would lose seats, but there would remain no decisive majority. A fresh premier would face the same intractable arithmetic.

Another possibility might be for Macron himself to step down. After winning the presidential election, his replacement would dissolve parliament and hope to secure a parliamentary majority in the ensuing legislative vote. But that, too, is uncertain.

Polls suggest the next occupant of the Elysée Palace will be Le Pen or Bardella. There is at least an odds-on chance that French electorate, having elected a far-right president, might think twice about handing them control of parliament.

In the end, France may not escape its predicament until its politicians accept the new political reality, which is that decisive majorities are a bygone phenomenon, absolute victory is obsolete, and compromise is not synonymous with failure.

Many think that transformation will not be feasible under the country’s current constitution. “This is no conventional parliamentary crisis, but a crise de régime” that will endure indefinitely.

“The system wasn't built to encourage – and even disincentivizes – the formation of ruling alliances typical across Europe. The Fifth Republic may well have entered its terminal phase.”